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Abstract
In the run up to the financial crisis of 2007-2009 many developing nations fell victim to massive
inflows of capital, capital that their financial systems found difficult to absorb. One of a number
of policy options to respond to such inflows is unremunerated reserve requirements (URR). Two
countries, Colombia and Thailand, deployed URR in the second half of the decade. This paper
analyses the extent to which those URRs were successful in reducing the overall level and
composition of capital inflows, reducing exchange rate appreciation and volatility, stemming
asset bubbles, and granting more independence for monetary policy. We find that URRs were
modestly successful in Colombia and Thailand, though Thailand was less of a success than
Colombia. In Colombia the controls were able to reduce the overall volume of inflows and stem
asset bubbles. In Thailand, the URR did reduce the overall volume of flows, and the
announcement of the URR caused a sharp drop in asset prices. However, in both cases the
controls were linked to exchange rate volatility and in Thailand asset prices recovered their
upward trend the day after the announcement. The results in this paper demonstrate that on the
there is still a role for capital controls in the 21st century, but such controls should be more
sophisticated than in years past.

1 – Introduction
The experience of nearly a decade of crises, from the 1994 Mexican Tequila Crisis, the
Asian Crisis in 1997, and Argentina 2001-2002, sparked a heated discussion regarding the need
for prudential measures to manage capital markets in developing countries. This discussion has
only intensified in the wake of the current crisis. The unmistakable cycle of boom and bust
experienced by several emerging economies raises the question of how to deal with capital
inflows during booms, and how to avoid sudden and rapid outflows during downturns. Fuelled
by cheap credit in the developed world, risk appetite among investors and a booming
commodities market, developing countries experienced very large capital inflows between 2005
and 2007. Most of these countries dealt with this unprecedented level of inflows by purchasing
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foreign currency in the exchange market, and accumulating large amounts of foreign reserves.
These exchange market interventions were often insufficient to curb the negative consequences
of excess inflows, and a few countries resorted to temporary capital controls. In this paper, we
attempt to investigate the experience of two countries that imposed unremunerated reserve
requirements (URR) on capital inflows during the boom, Colombia and Thailand. Specifically,
we ask the following question: were the capital controls in Colombia and Thailand effective in
(1) reducing capital inflows, (2) changing the composition of inflows from “hot money” towards
foreign direct investment (FDI), (3) stemming an assets bubble, (4) curbing the appreciation and
volatility of the exchange rate, and (5) allowing more independent monetary policy?
It is important to understand the complexities surrounding prudential measures to manage
capital markets in the 21st Century. First, it is important to understand the utility of measures in
order to prevent the next crisis. Second, it is just as important because developing countries will
experience massive swings in capital in the aftermath of the current crisis. The developed world
will maintain relatively low interest rates as a measure of expansionary monetary policy. The
developing world will not sustain rates that low. Thus there will be carry trade incentives for
short-term capital to flow to developing countries. This has already been the case in Brazil,
which saw a massive upswing in inflows in 2009, so much so that its currency appreciated over
30 percent on the dollar . As a response to these trends, Brazil imposed a temporary tax on
inflows of short-term capital. Other countries, such as Taiwan and Ecuador have also
experimented with similar capital controls. More are likely to follow.

2 – Rationale
Advocates for capital market liberalization believed that, by liberalizing the flows of
international capital, developing countries would benefit by getting access to cheaper credit from
developed markets, promoting growth and stability. That view, based on the assumption of
perfect capital markets, has been largely discredited with the recent experiences of currency
crises (Ocampo, Spiegel, and Stiglitz 2008). International capital flows tend to be pro-cyclical,
creating excess inflows during booms, and causing capital flight in moments of instability,
further aggravating crises. Moreover, it has been shown that capital market liberalization in
developing countries is not associated with economic growth (Prasad et al. 2003). Indeed, the
most recent research has shown that capital market liberalization is only associated with growth
in nations that have reached a certain institutional threshold—a threshold that most developing
nations are yet to achieve (Kose, Prasad, and Taylor 2009).
Ocampo, Spiegel and Stiglitz (2008) argue that capital controls: can be used to stabilize
short-term volatile capital flows; can give policymakers additional policy instruments that allow
them more effective and less costly macroeconomic stabilization measures; can promote growth
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and increase economic efficiency by reducing the volatility of financing and of real
macroeconomic performance; and can discourage long-term capital outflows.
There literature on capital controls generally discusses at least six core reasons why
nations may want to deploy them. In a comprehensive assessment of the literature, Magud and
Reinhart (2006) argue capital controls are often imposed based on four underlying fears: (1) fear
of appreciation, (2) fear of hot-money, (3) fear of large-inflows and (4) fear of loss of monetary
autonomy.
1 – Fear of appreciation: capital inflows cause upward pressure on the value of the
domestic currency, making domestic producers less competitive in the international market,
hurting exports and therefore the economy.
2 – Fear of “hot money”: the large injection of money into a small economy may cause
distortions, and eventually a sudden reversion if foreign investors try to leave simultaneously.
3 – Fear of large inflows: large volumes of capital inflows, even if not all hot money,
can cause dislocations in the financial system.
4 – Fear of loss of monetary autonomy: a trinity is always at work: it is not possible to
have a fixed (or highly managed) exchange rate, monetary policy autonomy, and open capital
markets. Specifically, when central banks intervene in the exchange market buying foreign
currency in order to curb the appreciation of the exchange rate, they effectively increase the
domestic monetary base. Trying to raise interest rates to offset that effect causes more capital
inflows, as foreign investors rush in to take advantage of higher yields.
A fifth one, raised by Ocampo and Palma (2008), is the fear of asset bubbles 2 . This is a
particularly important issue in the 2008 financial crisis, since the bursting of the real state bubble
was the root cause of the banking crisis around the globe.
A sixth “fear” is the fear of capital “flight” whereby capital may rapidly leave a nation
in the event of a crisis or because of contagion (Grabel 2003; Epstein 2005).
We structure our investigation on the effects of capital flows around the first five fears, as
explained in section 4, data and methodology. URRs are designed to manage capital inflows.
Thus the sixth fear of capital flight (outflows) is not analyzed here.
3 – Literature Review
The literature on the effectiveness of capital controls is too vast to cover here. However,
Magud and Reinhart (2006) conduct the most comprehensive and unique assessment of the
literature to 2006. In their analysis they express concern over the lack of a unified theoretical
framework to analyse the macroeconomic consequences of the controls, the heterogeneity of
2
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inflows.” Given the importance of this issue, we decided to investigate asset bubbles separately.
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countries and control measures, the multiplicity of policy goals and what constitutes “success,”
and the strong bias of studies to investigate a few country cases (mainly Chile and Malaysia) are
some factors that contribute to the difficulty in making generalized conclusions from the
literature in the field. Theirs is the most valiant attempt to overcome these shortcomings. What’s
more, the authors also “weight” the findings in the literature with respect to their econometric
rigor. In this section then, we summarize the main findings of Magud and Reinhart and discuss
the results of some recent work since that pathbreaking assessment.
Magud and Reinhart (2006) analyze studies on controls on inflows and outflows, as well
as multicountry studies separately. In order to account for the multiplicity of policy goals, they
narrow policy objectives to “four fears” mentioned in the previous section. Namely, they ask
whether the controls were able to (1) reduce the volume of net capital outflows, (2) alter the
composition of flows, (3) reduce real exchange rate pressures and (4) make monetary policy
more independent. Appendix 1 reproduces the authors’ analysis of the literature of controls on
capital inflows.
Magud and Reinhart (2006) also address the issue of methodological heterogeneity by
evaluating the methodological rigor of each of the studies. Specifically, the authors give a weight
of 0.1 if they find the rigor to be “low”, which are studies that consist mainly of descriptive
analysis of events and/or time series. Studies with rigor ranked “intermediate,” which received
weight of 0.5, are those that draw conclusions from a more formal evaluation of events, but still
lack a formal hypothesis testing. Finally, studies that have highly developed econometric
techniques, with well defined hypothesis testing, were ranked “high” and received a weight of 1.
Those weights were used to create a “weighted capital controls effectiveness index” and
compared against an unweighted “capital controls effectiveness index”. The authors conclude
that "in sum, capital controls on inflows seem to make monetary policy more independent, alter
the composition of capital flows and reduce real exchange rate pressures." They did not find
enough evidence, however, supporting that capital controls on inflows reduce the volume of net
flows. Their analysis of studies on outflows is beyond the scope of this paper but their
conclusions are also less clear. Table 3.1 reproduces their findings by country and type of study.
Table 3.1 – Magud and Reinhart (2006) summary of results by country and multicountry studies
Study:

Complete Sample
Control on Inflows
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Czech Republic
Malaysia (1989)

Reduce the volume
of net capital
inflows?
Unclear
Unclear
Unclear
Unclear
No
Yes

Did Capital Controls:
Reduce real
Alter the
exchange rate
composition of
pressures?
flows?
Yes
Unclear
Unclear
Yes
Unclear
Yes
Yes
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No
Unclear**
Unclear

Make monetary
policy more
independent?
Yes
Unclear
Yes
Yes

Malaysia (1994)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Thailand
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Control on
Outflows
Malaysia (1998)
Unclear
Yes
Spain
Unclear
Unclear
Unclear
Thailand
Yes
Yes
Yes
Multi-country
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
studies
Note: Yes stands for yes, it worked; No for no, it did not work; Unclear for mixed results; and blanks for results not
reported.

There have been a small handful of relevant studies since those examined by Magud and
Reinhart. Binici, Hutchison and Schindler (2009) use a panel data set of capital controls
developed by Schindler (2009) to investigate the level and composition of inflows. The data set
covers 74 countries during 1995-2005 and is disaggregated by asset class and by
inflows/outflows. They find that countries do not seem able to effectively stem inflows by legal
restrictions, but once capital is in the country governments seem better able to discourage
outflows in all categories, potentially making the country less vulnerable to sudden reversals in
capital flows. They also find that direct effects of restrictions on debt and equity outflows do not
induce attempts to circumvent the controls by substituting into other types of capital flows,
therefore, it is also effective in changing the composition.
An important drawback of the paper mentioned above is that it does not cover the
experience of countries that enacted capital controls in the most recent cycle of boom and crisis
(2005-2008). There were at least three countries that enacted capital controls to curb the large
inflows and appreciation of the exchange rates during this time period: Colombia, Thailand and
India. We were able to find two papers that evaluate the most recent Colombian experience and
one that addresses India’s capital controls, but to our knowledge there has been no studies
published on the capital controls effective in Thailand between December 2006 and March 2008.
Balin (2008) investigates the capital controls enacted in India, starting in mid-2007, with
the goals of reducing the volume of capital inflows, ending the appreciation of the Rupee,
discouraging further portfolio inflows, increasing the maturity of debt inflows, and reducing
volatility, turnover and speculation on the Mumbai exchange. The author concludes that the new
policies did little to achieve its goals, for two reasons. First, several of the goals of India’s
controls were unattainable, according to the empirical literature reviewed by Balin (2008).
Secondly, India’s capital controls made very little impact in the de facto situation experienced by
the Indian economy, that is, investors were able to circumvent the capital controls. The only
“success” of India’s experience was the improvement of the maturity profile of its external
commercial debt, although the author calls it debatable. India’s capital controls also seemed to
have had negative consequences, helping spur corruption and favoritism within India’s Reserve
5

Bank and Securities and Exchange Board, and raising the regulatory and capital-raising costs of
small and medium-sized businesses, tilting the business climate in India in favor of larger, more
influential corporations.
The recent Colombian experience was investigated by Concha and Galindo (2009) and
Clements and Kamil (2009). The first study uses a time period of 1998-2008, which includes, in
part, the URR effective between 1993-2000, whereas the latter addresses the 2007-2008 URRs
only. Although the time period used in the two studies is slightly different, their results are
largely the same. Both studies conclude that the capital controls in Colombia were not effective
in reducing overall capital flows or in curbing the appreciation of the Colombian Peso.
Moreover, Clements and Kamil (2009) find that the controls did reduce external borrowing, but
did not increase the independence of monetary policy, questions that were not addressed by
Concha and Galindo (2009). The striking difference between the results of the two papers is that
Concha and Galindo (2009) conclude that the controls decreased the volatility of the exchange
rate, whereas Clements and Kamil (2009) find that the controls increased its volatility. This is
particularly surprising considering the both studies use a similar GARCH model specification to
investigate the volatility of the exchange rate.
Finally, Jittrapanun(2009) creates a capital control index that measures the strength of capital
controls in Thailand during the period from 2005 to 2007 on a daily basis allows the author to
measure the impacts on a short term basis. The author found “capital controls, through direct
restrictions on portfolio inflows, do cause portfolio inflows to decline, with the greatest effect in
the second month of the implementation. However, similar to the results from other studies, it is
seen here that the restrictions’ effectiveness rapidly diminishes within six months of the
implementation, reflecting market adjustment to circumvent the controls.”(40)
4 – Capital Controls in Colombia and Thailand
Between 2003 and 2007 developing countries lived a likely unprecedented period of
economic growth. Their growth was in part the results of better macroeconomic policies, fiscal
responsibility and political stability from governments that had recently endured periods of
crisis. But just as important, their growth was fueled by a large inflow of capital from developed
economies, as investors took advantage of cheap credit in search of larger returns in the
developing world. The booming commodities market was also a large contributor to the flow of
capital towards countries that are commodity producers.
The large inflow of money also had negative consequences. Exchange rates soared,
making domestic exporters less competitive internationally. Since the recent experience of
currency crises was still fresh in policy makers’ minds, the fear of a sharp reversal was also a
concern. Most developing countries reacted by intervening in the exchange market, purchasing
foreign currency and accumulating large amounts of foreign reserves. Those interventions,
however, were often insufficient to curb the appreciation of the domestic currency. When the
6

financial crisis struck the developed world in 2008, the flow reversed and capital fled from
developing countries to safer investments in developed economies. Table 4.1 shows the 15
countries that experienced the largest positive changes in the financial account between 2002 and
2007. Most of those countries, especially the developing ones, experienced a strong reversal
between 2007 and 2008. That trend is reflected in their real effective exchange rates.
Table 4.1 – Changes in net financial account as % of 2007 GDP
Country

Romania
Argentina
Greece
Spain
Poland
South Africa
India
Russia
Turkey
Nigeria
Brazil
Ireland
Colombia
Portugal
Philippines

Total 2002 - 2007
Change as % of
2007 GDP
30.4%
18.6%
16.9%
16.8%
15.4%
15.1%
14.6%
14.5%
14.4%
14.2%
13.8%
10.5%
8.7%
7.5%
4.5%

Total 2007 - 2008
Change as % of
2007 GDP
-4.1%
-12.9%
4.0%
0.5%
1.0%
-5.8%
-9.7%
-35.9%
-4.3%
-6.2%
-9.0%
11.1%
-0.8%
8.6%
-11.4%

REER* Change
Jan/2002Dec/2007
29.7%
-55.1%
15.6%
17.2%
4.6%
43.9%
22.6%
41.9%
16.6%
15.3%
33.2%
30.5%
15.0%
10.6%
23.1%

REER* Change
Dec/2007Dec/2008
-5.0%
-8.4%
1.4%
0.9%
-8.2%
-32.5%
-18.9%
3.3%
-24.0%
13.1%
-25.4%
2.3%
-4.3%
0.6%
-6.7%

*

*
*
*

Notes: 45 largest economies were included in the calculations.
* REER – Real effective exchange rate when available, otherwise the nominal exchange rate $ per domestic
currency was used. Countries for which the REER was not available are marked with *.
Source: authors’ calculations with data from the International Financial Statistics (IMF).

Colombia
Colombia has had a long experience with capital controls. It started the liberalization of
its capital markets in 1991, but some controls remained in place until 2000, including an
unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) that was effective between 1993 and 2000, with the
goal of stemming the appreciation of the Colombian Peso (Concha and Galindo 2009). The
1993+ URRR designated percentage of foreign loans with a maturity of less than a designated
maximum be kept as a deposit in local currency, at zero interest for a certain percentage of the
loan and a stated period of time (approx 47 percent for one year). Economists have shown that
the URR during this period was effective in Colombia in reducing the volume of net capital
inflows, improving the term structure of foreign borrowing, and granting more independence to
monetary authorities. In some cases these effects were “speed bumps” however, rather than
serving as full stops on inflows (Ocampo 2003).
Like most developing countries, Colombia received large inflows of foreign capital
between 2005 and 2007, with a particularly sharp increase in the first quarter of 2007 (see figure
7

4.1). In order to stem the appreciation of the Peso, the central bank (Banco de la Republica)
intervened in the exchange market by buying foreign currency, resulting in a large accumulation
of foreign reserves (see figure 4.2). The intervention did not prevent the Colombian Peso from
appreciating further. Between June 28, 2006 and May 04, 2007, the Peso rose 28% against the
dollar.
Figure 4.1 – Colombia’s Net Capital Flows
Capital Controls
Capital Controls Lifted Q4 2008
imposed Q2 2007

6,000
5,000
4,000

$US Millions

3,000

Portfolio Investments
Other Investments
Financial Derivatives
Direct Investments

2,000
1,000
0

-1,000
-2,000
-3,000

Source data: International Financial Statistics

Q1 Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1 Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1 Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1
2000 2000 2001 2002 2003 2003 2004 2005 2006 2006 2007 2008 2009

On May 07, 2007, an URR was reintroduced on most type of external borrowings. 40%
of the funds were to be kept in an unremunerated account in pesos or US dollars with the Banco
de la Republica for six months. Other restrictions were also imposed, including a limit of 500%
of the overall gross exposure of each participant in the foreign exchange derivatives market and
lower URR for other current account related credit advances. On May 23 the 40% URR
requirement was extended to include all portfolio inflows by foreign investors (IMF 2008).
In addition to a URR, Colombia also deployed three other measures: limits on maturity
mismatches; limits on open positions of foreign exchange of financial intermediaries; and limits
on the amount of foreign currency pensions funds are able to hedge. These measures were seen
to have a stabilizing role during the current crisis (Villar 2010).
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Figure 4.2 – Colombia’s Foreign Reserves
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Clements and Kamil (2009) point out that excluding Colombian institutional funds from
the capital controls is of particular importance, since they are highly active in the trading of the
foreign exchange market. They also remark that Colombian residents and firms, also exempted
from the URR requirements, accounted for three-fourths of the of portfolio inflows in the precontrols era. In June 2007, an exemption was granted for equities issued abroad, which allowed
the issuance of stock through American Depository Receipts (ADRs) controls-free.
The capital controls underwent several modifications in late 2007 and in 2008, including
further exemptions for initial public offerings of equities in December 2007, an increase of the
URR on portfolio inflows from 40% to 50% and a minimum stay requirement of two-years on
FDI in May 2008 (for further details, see Clements and Kamil 2009; IMF 2008).
The collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 and the subsequent aggravation
of the financial crisis in the United States reversed the trend of capital as investors rushed to
safer assets in the developed world. Between mid-June and early October 2008, the Colombian
Peso fell almost 30% against the U.S. dollar. On October 09, 2008 the Colombian government
announced that the URR as well as the two-year minimum stay requirement on FDI were being
lifted.
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Thailand
With fresh memories of the capital inflow boom that ended with the Asian crisis in 1997,
the Bank of Thailand (BOT) was swift to counteract the large appreciation of the Thai Baht in
2006. When capital market interventions did not curb the rise of the Baht as foreign reserves
soared (see figure 4.3), the BOT started reversing a long trend of capital market deregulation on
December 4th, instructing financial institutions to refrain from several types of foreign exchange
market activities with the goal of stemming speculation (Economist Inteligence Unit 2006).
Figure 4.3 – Thailand’s Foreign Reserves
Capital Controls
lifted M3 2008
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Thailand’s BOT introduced a number of measures to stem capital inflows in November
and December of 2006. In November, the BOT prohibited financial institutions from issuing
and selling means of exchange in Thailand to non-residents. On 6 December 2006, the
BOT prohibited the sale or purchase of all debt securities (Jittrapanun 2009). The Thai Baht
continued rising and on December 18, 2006, the BOT imposed an URR of 30% on most types of
capital inflows, excluding FDI and amounts not exceeding $20,000. A full refund of the principal
would be given if the funds remained in Thailand for at least one year, otherwise, two-thirds of
the principal would be returned, after BOT approval (IMF 2007). The announcement hit the
stock market hard, with the Bangkok SET index plunging almost 15%. The following day, the
BOT announced that foreign investment in stocks would be exempted from the URR, and the
market recovered most of its previous days loses (Economist Inteligence Unit 2006).
In 2007, several changes were made to Thailand’s newly introduced capital controls, and
a number of other transactions became exempt from the URR requirement (IMF 2008). By the
beginning of 2008, when credit was becoming increasing tight in the developed countries, the
pressure on the Thai Baht to appreciate disappeared. In the beginning of February, the BOT
10

raised limits for several capital account transactions and on March 03 it lifted the URR
altogether.

5 – Data and Methodology
We draw on the recent literature to develop models that test the use of URRs in Colombia
and Thailand in allaying each of the “five fears” of capital flows discussed above. In so doing,
and to avoid controversy, we only deploy techniques considered “high” in the Magud-Reinhart
methodological rankings. Indeed, we draw on these methods and make innovations to the
models by examining the time bound effects of various controls used, by deploying monthly
dummies when the controls came in effect and interacting these dummies with other independent
variables.
Our models attempt to assess the effectiveness of the capital controls in pursuing the
following five policy goals:
12345-

reducing excessive net inflows;
reducing inflows of hot money while preserving inflows of FDI;
avoiding possible asset price bubbles;
curbing the appreciation and volatility of the exchange rate;
increasing monetary autonomy (this question is embedded in model 4).

The first two models are run on a quarterly basis, from Q1 2000 to Q4 2008 (36 quarters).
All other models use daily data from 2003 to August 2009. We use quarterly balance of payment
data from the International Financial Statistics (IMF). GDP data are taken from the World
Development Indicators (World Bank). All other data were taken from Datastream (Thomson).
We use panel data with fixed effects estimates in models 1 and 2 in order to account for
the trend of capital flows from developed to developing countries during the time investigated. In
model 3, we use OLS with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Equation 4, which address
policy questions 4 and 5, use a Generalized Autorregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity
(GARCH) approach, which estimates, through log likelihood, the effect of the capital controls on
both the level and the volatility of the exchange rate.

1 – Total Net Capital Flows
We use panel data models with fixed effects estimates to investigate the impact of the
controls on the overall levels of capital flows. The first panel contains 10 South American
11

countries and the second 11 East Asian countries for which data was available (Japan was
excluded).
Fit = β1 CurAccit + β2 Ci + β3 Qt + β4 Controlsit + εt
Where:
F
– Total net capital flows as percentage of GDP.
CurAcc – Current Account balance as percentage of GDP. Most other authors have found the
current account to be an important determined of capital flows, for example
DeGregorio et al. (2000). As the authors point out, ultimately it is excess expenditure
that drives capital movements.
C
- Country-specific fixed effects 3 .
Q
- Time (quarter-specific) effects. This variable capures not only the overall trend of
capital flows, but also any unobservable effects that alter the level of capital flows to
the countries in the dataset, for example, the macroeconomic environment in the
developed world.
Controls – Capital controls dummy. In general, the quarter was included if the capital controls
were effective during more than half of the quarter. The capital controls dummy for
Colombia covers 2Q07 to 3Q08, and the one for Thailand covers 1Q07 to 4Q07.
Although the URR in Thailand was not completely lifted until March 3, 2008, the BOT
relaxed several requirements on February 04 of that year. There were also a very large
inflows in March 08, after the URR was lifted, according to monthly Balance of
Payments data from the BOT 4 , therefore including the quarter in the controls period
would result in inaccurate estimates.

2 – Composition of Capital Flows:
We investigate whether the capital controls affected the FDI and non-FDI inflows
differently. We run the similar models to the one explained above, but using FDI and non-FDI as
dependent variables. This method was used, for exemple, in Cardoso and Goldfajn (2007),

3

This variable is very powerful in the sense that it captures the effect of any omitted variables that differ across
countries and is relatively stable during the time period investigated. Ideally, however, we should include any
country-specific variables that vary across time. This was not always possible. One such variable is the spread
between domestic and international interest rates, which is included in most models of international capital flows. In
the context of our panel data, we would need to use comparable measures of interest rates across countries, which
were not available, therefore that variable was omitted. However, as long as interest rate spreads changed relatively
uniformly in different countries across the time period investigated, which we believe is the case, that change would
be captured by the time dummies.

4

http://www.bot.or.th/English/Statistics/EconomicAndFinancial/ExternalSector/Pages/ StatBalanceofPayments.aspx
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Gallengo, Hernandez and Schmidt-Hebbel (1999) and Valdez-Prieto and Soto (2000). In
addition, we run the model subtracting FDI flows from non-FDI flows in order to test whether
the coefficient for the Capital Controls Dummy is the same in both cases:
(FnonFDIit – FDIit) = γ1 CurAccit + γ2 Ci + γ3 Qt + γ4 Controlsit + εt
Where each γ coefficient is equivalent to: βnf – βfdi. A negative coefficient for the
Controls dummy indicates that the capital controls decreased non-FDI inflows more than FDI
inflows, as we expect. Similarly, the t-test on γ4 (H0 = 0) tells us if the difference is statistically
significant.

3 – Asset Prices:
We used stock market indices as a proxy for asset prices, that was done, for example, by
Ocampo and Palma (2008). Our model, estimated using OLS, is the following:
ΔStockt = β0 + β1 ΔIndext + β2 Announcet + β3 Controlst + β4 Controlst*ΔIndext + β5
PostControlst + β6 PostControlst*ΔIndext + εt
Where:
ΔStock – Domestic stock market index (in log change). For Colombia we used the IGBC index,
for Thailand the MAI, for India the SENSEX and for Brazil the Bovespa. Our data
starts in September 2003, which is the earliest available for the Thailand MAI index.
For Brazil, the data go from 01/01/2009 to 11/11/2009.
ΔIndex – Regional stock market index (in log change). We use the “FTSE Emerging Latin
America Index” for Brazil and Colombia and the “FTSE Asia Pacific excl. Japan, India,
Pakistan, New Zealand and Australia” for India and Thailand. 5
Announce – Dummy for the day of the announcement that capital controls would be introduced,
or the first trading day if the announcement was made on the weekend or after market
hours. We expect the stock market to fall in response to the announcement. For the case
of Thailand, we use two dummies, one for December 19, 2006, the first trading day
after the announcement, and another for the following day, when the BOT reversed part
of its decision and exempted equity investments from the URR.
Controls – Capital controls dummy, for the time the URR was in effect each country. We expect
a negative coefficient, indicating that the controls cooled the stock market rise.

5

Ideally, we would use indices that exclude the country investigated to avoid endogeneity, but unfortunately
regional indices excluding Colombia and Thailand were not available. However, considering the small size of their
economies compared to Latin America and Asia respectively, the endogeneity was likely small and would not affect
the results.
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Controls * ΔIndex – We multiply the dummy by the regional index, as a measure for
international independence. We expect a negative coefficient, indicating that the capital
controls made the domestic stock market more independent of movements in
international markets.
In order to investigate whether the controls had any lasting effects on the stock market,
we introduce dummies for the three months following the date the controls were lifted:
Postcontrols – Dummy for 3-month period after controls were lifted.
Postcontrols * ΔIndex – Measure for international independence after controls were lifted.

4 – Exchange Rates and Monetary Autonomy
Our model 4 analyzes both the effect of the controls on exchange rate and on monetary
autonomy. This model is similar to the one used by Edwards and Rigobon (2009) to investigate
the Chilean capital controls, and we use the method used by Clements and Kamil (2009) to
assess whether the capital controls were successful in increasing monetary autonomy. We use a
GARCH (1,1) specification to capture the effect of the controls on both the level and volatility of
the exchange rates:
ΔRt = β0 + β1 ΔIntt + β2 ΔUSIntt + β3 ΔEMBIt + β4 ΔTOTt + β5 CBIntt + β6 Controlst
+ β7 Controlst * ΔIntt + εt
εt~N(0,σt2)
σt2 = η0 + η1 εt-1 + η2 σt-12 + η3 ΔIntt + η4 ΔUSIntt + η5 ΔEMBIt + η6 ΔTOTt + η7 CBIntt + η8
Controlst + νt
Where:
ΔR

– Nominal Exchange Rate US Dollar per domestic currency, so that an increase indicates
an appreciation. We use log changes.
ΔInt – Change in domestic overnight interbank lending rates. An increase in domestic interest
rates is expected to appreciate the domestic currency.
ΔUSInt – Change in the US overnight interbank rates. We expect a negative coefficient for the
US rate.
ΔEMBI – Change in JP Morgan EMBI Global Spread, country-specific for Colombia, and Asia
for Thailand due to data availability. We expect an increase in the EMBI to decrease
the domestic currency.
ΔTOT – Proxy for terms of trade: price of the largest trade item in value for each country (in log
change). Oil is the largest trade item for both Colombia and Thailand, the first as an
exporter, the second as an importer, according to COMTRADE. We expect an increase
14

in the price of oil to increase the value of the Colombian Peso, but to decrease the value
of the Thai Baht.
CBInt – Central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market. This variable is only available
for Thailand.
Controls – Capital controls dummy
Controlst * ΔIntt – We interact the capital controls dummy with the changes in interest rates in
order to the capture any increase in monetary independence. If the controls increased monetary
independence, the Central Bank should be able to increase interest rates without causing the
appreciation of the exchange rate (or, at least, decreasing the effect). This is the method used by
Clements and Kamil (2009). Other authors also use interest rates as a measure of monetary
independence, including Gallengo, Hernandez and Schmidt-Hebbel (1999), Laurens and Cardoso
(1998), Edison and Reinhart (2001) and DeGregorio et al. (2000).

An innovation: Measuring the Temporary Effect of Capital Controls
Many authors have indicated that the effects of capital controls tend to be temporary,
including Edwards and Rigobon (2009), Cardoso and Goldfajn (2007) and DeGregorio et al.
(2000). In order to account for a temporary effect, we introduce alternative capital control
dummies in the three models that use daily data. We create one dummy for each of the 4 months
after the capital controls were introduced and one dummy for the remaining time the controls
were in effect.

6 – Results
Using these models and the best available data we find that URRs were of only a modest
success in Colombia and even less so in Thailand. In both countries the URR significantly
reduced the overall level of capital inflows and played some role in stemming asset bubbles.
However, in both cases exchange rate volatility increased and there was no effect on monetary
independence or the composition of inflows. In what follows we exhibit the results of each
series of model runs.
Model 1 – Total Net Capital Flows
The results from our panel fixed effects model show that the capital controls were
effective in decreasing the overall level of capital flows in Colombia by approximately 1% of
GDP, when compared to other South American countries. The current account, as we expected,
is also a significant determined of capital flows in the region. An increase in the current account
of 1% of GDP is associated with a decrease in capital flows of approximately 0.4% of GDP.
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In Thailand, our regression results show that, when compared to other East Asian
countries, the capital controls imposed in December 2006 were effective in reducing overall
capital flows by approximately 0.75% of GDP. This effect was marginally significant (p=0.053).
This is similar to the findings of Jittrapanun (2009). The current account was also an important
determinant of capital flows in the East Asian countries investigated. An increase in the current
account of 1% of GDP is associated with a decrease in the net capital flows of approximately
0.6% of GDP. Detailed results are presented in Table 6.1.
Model 2 – Composition of Capital Flows
Although the capital controls were effective in reducing overall capital flows in
Colombia, when we disaggregate the flows into FDI and non-FDI, the effect of the controls are
not statistically significant. The results presented in Table 6.1 show coefficients with the
expected direction (-0.8% and -0.1% for FDI and non-FDI respectively). The difference between
the two estimated by the “non-FDI minus FDI” equation is also not significant. The current
account has a significant effect on FDI flows (-0.2% of GDP), but it is not significant for nonFDI flows.
Our panel for East Asia indicates that the capital controls decreased FDI flows in
Thailand by approximately 1% of GDP, but had no effect on non-FDI flows. The difference
between the two estimates, however, is not statistically significant. Although the URR did not
apply to FDI flows, this result is not completely surprising. The drop in FDI flows were likely an
unintended consequence of the increased uncertainty generated by the new policy. Investors
would likely become wary of long-term commitments. Instead, the short-term investments likely
suffered less from the increased uncertainty, and considering that the Bank of Thailand exempted
equity investments in listed stocks from the URR one day after the capital controls were
introduced, we would expect non-FDI flows to be relatively unaffected.
Contrary to our results from South America, the current account was a strong determinant
of non-FDI flows but not of FDI flows in East Asia. An increase in the current account of 1% of
GDP is associated with a decrease in non-FDI flows of approximately 0.5% of GDP.
Table 6.1 – Panel FE regression results models 1 and 2 (quarterly data)

Dependent Variable:
Current Account

Net Flows
-0.395***
(0.122)

Colombia – Number of obs: 356
Non-FDI
-0.194
(0.121)

FDI
-0.202***
(0.045)

(Non-FDI – FDI)
0.008
(0.135)

Controls

-0.950**
(0.404)

-0.835
(0.534)

-0.116
(0.311)

-0.719
(0.775)

0.162

0.122

0.158

0.095

R2
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Dependent Variable:
Current Account

Controls

Thailand – Number of obs: 385
Net Flows
Non-FDI
-0.594***
-0.537***
(0.093)
(0.127)
-0.759*
(0.391)

0.284
(0.567)

FDI
-0.057
(0.103)

(Non-FDI – FDI)
-0.479**
(0.211)

-1.043**
(0.438)

1.327
(0.935)

R2
0.286
0.190
0.155
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
*, **, *** indicates statistically significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.

0.159

Model 3 – Asset Prices
Our OLS regression estimates shows that, after causing a sharp drop of about 3% in the
Colombian stock market the day the capital controls became effective, they may have slightly
curbed the market rise during the controls period (0.1% per day, significant at the 10% level).
More interestingly, the coefficient of the variable “controls * index” indicates that the capital
controls made the stock market in Colombia more independent than the regional index.
Specifically, before controls, a movement in the index explained almost 50% (0.47) of the
change in the Colombian stock market. During the controls, that correlation fell, and a movement
of the index explained only 32% of the change in the Colombian market (0.47- 0.15 = 0.32). This
is largely in line with that we observe in Figure 6.1. The Colombian stock market stopped
increasing with the Latin American Index before it peaked in May 2008, but also didn’t fall as
sharply when the market plunged. Our monthly dummies indicate that this effect was not
statistically significant in the first 4 months, but it became significant in the remaining time the
URR was in effect. The coefficient estimates from the post-control period indicates that there
were no lasting effects after the controls were lifted.
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Figure 6.1 – Colombian Stock Market (01/01/2003 = 100)
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The estimates for Thailand show a very strong drop (more than 10%) in the stock market
the day the capital controls became effective. However, when the Bank of Thailand decided to
exempt equity investments in stocks from the URR the following day, most of that loss was
reversed. During the remaining time the capital controls were in effect, our coefficient estimate
of the controls dummy indicates a small but statistically significant increase in the stock market
level (0.16%) this effect may indicate that the stock market slowly recovered the remaining
losses suffered the day of the announcement. Our monthly dummies show that this recovery was
statistically significant in the 2nd month and after the 4th month, but not during the 1st, 3rd and 4th
months. As with Colombia, there were no lasting effects during the post-controls period. Table
6.2 presents the results in detail.
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Table 6.2 – OLS regression results model 3 (daily data)
Dependent Variable:

Colombia Stock Market Index
(log changes)

Thailand Stock Market Index
(log changes)

Δ Regional Index

0.476***
(0.058)

0.301***
(0.031)

Announcement day

-0.030***
(0.0007)

-0.106***
(0.0006)

-

0.080***
(0.0008)

Controls dummy

-0.001*
(0.0008)

0.002**
(0.0006)

Controls dummy * Index

-0.156**
(0.075)

-0.031
(0.052)

Post-controls dummy

-0.002
(0.002)

0.0008
(0.001)

Post-controls dummy * Index

-0.086
(0.087)

-0.091
(0.068)

Constant

0.001**
(0.0005)

-0.0008**
(0.0004)

Announcement day 2

R2
0.177
Number of observations: 1550
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
*, **, *** indicates statistically significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.

0.199

Model 4 – Exchange Rate and Monetary Independence
Although the primary goal of the Banco de la Republica was to curb the appreciation of
the Colombian Peso, the results from our GARCH model indicate that they were largely
unsuccessful. The coefficients from the mean equation show that the controls not only didn’t
have a consistent effect on the level of the exchange rate, but were associated with an
appreciation of the Peso during the first month, as indicated by our monthly dummies. Moreover,
the variance equations show that the controls increased the volatility of the exchange rate, and
that effect was significant throughout the controls period. Our measure of monetary
independence, the interaction of the dummy with the changes in the domestic interest rates, did
not yield a significant coefficient, indicating that the controls may not brought more autonomy
over the monetary policy. As we expected, an increase in the EMBI spread is associated with a
decrease in the exchange rate and an increase in the price of oil is positively related to the
exchange rate. The domestic and U.S. interest rates did not have a significant effect on the
exchange rate. Detailed results are in table 6.3.
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Table 6.3 – $/COLOMBIAN PESO – GARCH regression results model 4 (daily data)
Baseline

Monthly Dummies

Mean Equation

Variance Equation

Mean Equation

Variance Equation

Δ Domestic interest rate

-0.00278*
(0.0015)

3.300**
(1.468)

-0.00212
(0.00143)

3.301***
(1.278)

Δ US interest rate

-0.00143
(0.0015)

-2.177***
(0.459)

-0.00128
(0.00149)

-2.187***
(0.459)

-0.00013***
(0.00001)

0.0298*
(0.0158)

-0.00013***
(0.00001)

0.0224
(0.0153)

Δ Oil price

0.0177***
(0.0046)

42.149***
(4.814)

0.0169***
(0.0046)

44.479***
(4.382)

Controls dummy

0.000535
(0.00042)

1.458***
(0.190)

Controls dummy * domestic
interest rate

0.00767
(0.00535)

-0.435
(4.950)

Controls dummy month 1

0.0041***
(0.00157)

2.045***
(0.738)

Controls dummy month 2

-0.00135
(0.00193)

-184.491***
(1.624)

Controls dummy month 3

-0.00044
(0.0020)

1.777
(1.301)

Controls dummy month 4

-0.00424
(0.00383)

3.498***
(0.388)

Controls dummy remaining
months

0.000509
(0.000486)

1.335***
(0.199)

0.00019**
(0.0001)

-14.68***
(0.166)

Δ EMBI spread

Constant

0.00018*
(0.0001)

-14.701***
(0.174)

Wald statistic
179.56***
Number of observations: 1738
Exchange rates in log changes.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
*, **, *** indicates statistically significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively

187.57***

In Thailand, the capital controls seem to have had no effect on the level of the exchange
rate, but as in Colombia, it increased its volatility. Our GARCH estimates with monthly
dummies confirm that the increased volatility was present throughout the controls period.
Similarly to Colombia, our results show that the controls did not increase monetary autonomy in
Thailand. As we expected, the Global EMBI Asia Spread is negatively related with the exchange
rate level. The domestic interest rates did not yield a significant change in the exchange rate, but
the U.S. rate was positively related with an appreciation of the Baht (we expected a negative
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relationship). The price of oil was also related to an increase in the exchange rate, where we
expected a decrease, since Thailand is an importer of oil. Table 6.4 contains the results.
Table 6.4 – $/THAI BATH – GARCH regression results model 4 (daily data)
Baseline

Monthly Dummies

Mean Equation

Variance Equation

Mean Equation

Variance Equation

Δ Domestic interest rate

0.00055
(0.0006)

0.0347
(1.5776)

0.00050
(0.0006)

-0.349
(0.999)

Δ US interest rate

0.000493
(0.00042)

0.887***
(0.202)

0.000516
(0.000414)

0.887***
(0.202)

Δ EMBI spread

-0.00002***
(0.00001)

-0.0175*
(0.00915)

-0.00002***
(0.00001)

-0.0165*
(0.0095)

Δ Oil price

0.00784***
(0.00286)

5.987*
(3.545)

0.00791***
(0.00285)

5.278
(3.704)

Central Bank Intervention

-0.03511
(0.0342)

-7.829
(23.640)

-0.03355
(0.0349)

-22.777
(24.33)

Controls dummy

-0.00053
(0.00067)

3.108***
(0.0939)

Controls dummy * domestic
interest rate

-0.00048
(0.00938)

-2.0561
(1.981)

Controls dummy month 1

0.00104
(0.00213)

2.301***
(0.344)

Controls dummy month 2

0.004265
(0.00337)

2.644***
(1.019)

Controls dummy month 3

-0.00031
(0.00215)

2.494***
(0.882)

Controls dummy month 4

0.00113
(0.00189)

2.358***
(0.608)

Controls dummy remaining
months

-0.00117
(0.00094)

3.301***
(0.113)

0.00004
(0.00007)

-13.3964***
(0.132)

Constant

0.000044
(0.00006)

-13.3791***
(0.132)

Wald statistic
27.59***
Number of observations: 1738
Exchange rates in log changes.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
*, **, *** indicates statistically significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively
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31.3***

7. Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we sought to examine the extent to which URRs, a form of capital control
on inflows of short-term capital, alleviated pressure deriving from the five fears of massive
capital inflows to developing countries. Whereas the literature on controls deployed in the late
1990s and the early part of the first decade of the 21st Century were found to make monetary
policy more independent, alter the composition of capital flows and reduce real exchange rate
pressures, our study comes to more modest conclusions. In the case of URRs in Colombia and
Thailand (see table 7.1), we find that the controls reduced total inflows, cooled asset price
bubbles (albeit very temporarily in Thailand’s case), and increased the volatility of the exchange
rate.

Table 7.1: Summary of results.
Country

Total
Inflows

Composition

Colombia

Decrease
total
inflows.

No
statistically
significant
effect.

Thailand

Decrease
total
inflows.

Decrease
FDI, but no
effect on
non-FDI.
Difference is
statistically
significant.

Asset Prices
(Stock Market)

Exchange Rate

Some evidence that
it cooled the stock
market rise. Made
the domestic stock
market more
independent from
the regional index.
May have avoided
or reduced a
bubble.
Sharp drop on
announcement day,
but recovered on
the following day.
No lasting effect.

Appreciated the
exchange rate
(effect
significant for
first month).
Increased
volatility.

No effect on
level. Increased
volatility.

Monetary
Independence
(Interest
Rate)
No effect.

No effect.

Why do our findings slightly deviate from previous work that finds a stronger effect of
capital controls and what are the lessons for policy-making in the wake of the current financial
crisis? Recent research suggests that the controls in Colombia and Thailand may not have been
complex enough to stem inflows packaged in creative ways, and at least in Thailand, may not
have been bold enough to significantly affect inflows.
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Given that capital controls are controversial, finance ministries are often timid from the
start in issuing a control so as not to cause too much of a disruption in the markets. What’s
more, when controls are relatively simply designed, investors often construct innovative
contracts to circumvent the controls.
One of the most profound ways that controls have been circumvented has been through
disguising short-term capital as FDI. In Brazil investors would create a public company and list
it on the BOVESPA. The investor would own all the company’s shares and manipulate their
price by arranging purchase and sale at low liquidity. The foreign investor would then invest in
the public company as a foreigner and deem the investment an FDI investment because it
acquired more than half of the shares and then performed inter-firm loans that are considered
FDI. In our paper we find that Thailand’s controls decreased FDI. Seen through the lens of
Carvalho and Garcia’s analyses such an effect may not be so negative.
Intermediaries have also learned to circumvent capital controls through the creation of
sophisticated derivative schemes. A holdover from the 1960s, Brazil has accounts, that allow
non-resident institutions to hold an account in Brazil in the national currency that make it simpler
to direct funds outside Brazil. These accounts were not covered under Brazil’s capital controls
on inflows. It is worth quoting exactly how these accounts referred to as CC-5s, were used:
“to bypass this tax, the market sought ways to avoid converting currency.
One of these was what was called at the time a “Blue Chip Swap.” This involved a
foreign asset that the investor would transfer to the off-shore branch of a Brazilian
financial institution against a CC-5 credit of the investor in Brazil. The foreign investor
delivered the foreign asset and the domestic counterpart made the deposit in Brazil in
the foreign agent’s CC-5 account. Through the CC-5, the foreign investor had free
access to the floating rate exchange market and sent the money abroad without
restrictions when the operation was finalized. With this, international transactions
between financial institutions bypassed the IOF tax by not officially converting
currency. These operations involving unofficial currency exchange, in defiance of the
Central Bank’s monopoly, were known as back to back operations. The Blue Chip Swap
is one example of this type of operation.” (Carvalho and Garcia 2006, 27)
It is clear that from a welfare perspective the rationale for capital controls is more justified
now than it ever was. Yet, based on the econometric evidence of this study and findings from
economists such as Carvalho and Garcia, one could walk away with one of two conclusions.
First, citing the fact that investors can circumvent controls one could argue that controls are very
ineffective and therefore developing countries must learn other means of alleviating the five
fears. On the other hand, one could conclude that more vigor and attention is needed in the
design of particular controls, not just their justification.
When the military backed government of Thailand, instituted after a coup only three
months before, imposed the URR on non-FDI capital inflows in December 2006, Bangkok’s
SET stop market index fell almost 15%. The government reaction, in what the Economist
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Intelligence Unit calls “an abrupt and embarrassing about-face,” was to reverse the requirement
for equity investments in the stock market (Economist Inteligence Unit 2006). The index
recovered most of its losses the following day, but the credibility of government to manage the
financial system was likely severely damaged. The BOT went on to exempt several other types
of transactions from the URR in the following weeks (IMF 2007), making it too weak to achieve
it’s goal of curbing the appreciation of the Baht.
Thailand’s hesitant approach to capital controls is a large mistake in today’s complex
financial system. A recent study on Brazil comes to similar conclusions that we do for Colombia
and Thailand (Carvalho and Garcia 2006). In a recent NBER report, Brazilian economists
Bernardo Carvalho and Marcio Garcia show that Brazil’s attempts to deter inflows were only
effective for a brief period—from announcement to no longer than six months. To follow-up on
their econometric exercises, they conduct interviews with key market players who anonymously
revealed how controls were circumvented in Brazil between 1993 and 2000. Carvalho and
Garcia (2006) demonstrate that capital controls are circumvented through two channels. First,
investors disguise short-term investments as long-term equity or trade finance. Second, that
investors design sophisticated derivative instruments to avoid controls.
Given the continued pro-cyclical nature of capital flows we urge that nations deploy all
possible avenues for counter-cyclical policies, and that capital controls on inflows remain a
useful tool. Indeed, it is clear that controls did indeed reduce total capital inflows and have an
effect on asset prices—all during a crisis where asset bubbles were among the core causes. Chile
is an example of a nation that designed sophisticated controls to deter intermediaries from
circumventing their URR in the 1990s. Chile saw that investors were developing schemes to
disguise short-term capital as FDI and responded by expanding their URR to include “potentially
damaging speculative direct investment” to some success (Carvalho and Garcia 2006). As we
move into a new phase of the current crisis we may do well to review the innovative responses of
nations like Chile in order to design more effective controls on inflows.
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Appendix 1: Magud and Reinhart (2006) Table 3
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Appendix 1: Magud and Reinhart (2006) Table 3 (continued)
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